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ABSTRACT:  
 
This study examines sustainability reporting assurance (SRA) provider use of sustainability 
restatements as a means to create legitimacy in the developing SRA market. In comparison to 
financial data, mistakes in sustainability reporting are more likely to be made and less likely 
to be discovered prior to reporting. A lack of clear reporting standards and ambiguous SRA 
guidelines create a setting where providers can use restatements in an attempt to demonstrate 
both a problem in sustainability reporting and assurance as the solution to that issue. Based 
on a sample of U.S. firms from 2010–14, we find that SRA is associated with an increased 
likelihood of sustainability restatements, that the association is stronger for error restatements 
than for restatements due to methodological updates, and that SRA is significantly associated 
with the disclosure of quantitatively non-material restatements. We also document 
differences in these relations across provider-type, with only consultant assurance 
significantly associated with methodological restatements and restatements of a non-material 
amount. Our findings support differences between sustainability report restatements and 
financial restatements, and provide evidence in support of our argument that assurance 
providers may be using restatements in an attempt to expand market share in a new 
professional space.  
 
KEYWORDS: sustainability restatements, sustainability assurance services, 
professionalization, legitimacy. 
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Introduction 
The growth in the number of firms issuing stand-alone sustainability reports is well 
documented among the business community, accounting professionals (KPMG, 2013), and 
academics alike (e.g. Cho, Michelon, Patten, & Roberts, 2014; Peters & Romi, 2015; 
Unerman, Bebbington, & O’Dwyer, 2007). Similarly, voluntary external assurance of these 
documents has also grown (O’Dwyer, 2011; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Simnett, Nugent, & 
Huggins, 2009) with KPMG (2013) reporting 59 percent of the world’s largest 250 
companies seeking external assurance. Standard setters and stakeholders often assume 
sustainability reporting assurance (SRA) provides credibility to sustainability information 
(e.g. Beets & Souther, 1999; Cho et al., 2014; GRI, 2013; Hodge, Subramaniam, & Stewart, 
2009; O’Dwyer, Unerman, & Hession, 2005; Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett, Vanstraelen, & 
Chua, 2009), based on a commonly accepted understanding in the auditing literature that 
assurance leads to improved discovery of accounting errors prior to reporting, resulting in a 
negative relationship between audit quality and financial reporting restatements (fewer 
restatements and improved reporting quality) (e.g. Palmrose & Scholz, 2004; Pomeroy & 
Thornton, 2008).  
Critical research questions the assumption that the only goal of SRA is to provide 
credibility to reporting (Boiral & Gendron, 2011; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; O’Dwyer, Owen 
& Unerman, 2011; Owen, Swift, Bowerman, & Humphrey, 2000). Rather, as SRA providers 
attempt to gain market share in a new professional space with significant unmet capacity 
(Abbott 1988; O’Dwyer et al 2011), different professions must strategically use their current 
services to create demand (Abbott, 1988; Malsch, 2013). This strategy includes defining a 
problem within the professional sphere and then producing measurable solutions to legitimate 
their professional superiority (Abbott, 1988; Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Gendron & Barrett, 
2004; Malsch, 2013; Power, 1997; 2003). Legitimacy provides the foundation for 
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professional jurisdictional claims, while its absence provides a central line for attack from 
competitors.  
Based on Power’s (2003) assertion that the legitimacy created by assurance providers, 
by extension, co-produces legitimacy for the client, we argue that sustainability restatements 
can be used as a legitimacy co-building tactic. We suggest this possibility exists as a 
restatement of information from prior sustainability reporting is less likely to be viewed 
negatively than in financial reporting for various reasons. These reasons include the lack of 
clear/universally adopted reporting standards (e.g. Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Collison & 
Slomp, 2000), ambiguous SRA guidelines (Moroney & Trotman, 2016), and under-
developed or non-existent firm-specific internal sustainability reporting systems, among 
others.1 Further, prior studies (e.g., O’Dwyer et al., 2011) document that co-legitimacy 
building benefits are communicated in SRA provider-client negotiations during the SRA 
engagement. If SRA providers successfully alter the meaning of restatements from an 
indicator of assurance failure, as is the case with financial restatements, to one of improved 
reporting quality (GRI 2013), it allows them to use restatements as a legitimacy-building 
tactic. Accordingly, we expect a higher prevalence of restatements in sustainability reports 
where assurance is in place. We also acknowledge the presence of two distinct SRA provider 
types, accounting and consulting firms2 and we consider whether the differences in their 
knowledge and skill sets (Huggins et al., 2011; Pflugrath et al., 2011) influence the ways in 
which they use restatements3.  
                                                        
1 Similar to Moroney and Trotman (2016), in the absence of prior literature and clear standards, we rely on 
professional auditor experience and first-hand knowledge to posit possible challenges facing SRA providers in 
discovering errors within sustainability reports prior to reporting. Accordingly, we conducted phone 
interviews with sustainability assurance experts (e.g. leading assurance specialists at the director level within 
Big 4 auditing firms) prior to conducting our study.   
2 Consultant providers consist mainly of engineering and sustainability service firms (GRI, 2013).   
3  To gain an understanding of the use and attitude toward restatements from a sustainability consultant 
perspective, we contacted consultant assurance standard developers. Our discussions indicate that the 
consulting profession similarly views restatements as a tool to report a correction to previously reported 
inaccurate information; restatements are currently not addressed in the AA1000AS standards; corrections to 
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Our study explores the use of formal restatements of data within sustainability reports 
for a sample of U.S. S&P 500 firms over the period 2010-14. The U.S. is an interesting 
setting for our analysis in that prior research documents significantly lower assurance rates in 
the U.S. than in other countries (Cho et al., 2014; Peters & Romi, 2015), suggesting an 
enhanced opportunity for assurance providers to work toward expanding their market. This 
supports Abbott’s (1988) claim that investigating the strategies toward gaining market share 
in a professional space is most relevant when the market is relatively young and expanding, 
as there is significant untapped capacity to generate profits. Moreover, Abbott (1988) argues 
that, in the U.S. in particular, it is ultimately through public opinion that professions establish 
the legitimacy necessary to achieve the rights to a professional space, and the use of 
restatements to build legitimacy relies on public opinion. We review 1,200 standalone 
sustainability reports and find 177 that contain at least one restatement, 116 of which include 
restatements due to error. Contrary to financial reporting restatements and consistent with 
descriptive evidence in KPMG (2011; 2013)4 surveys, we find that voluntary assurance of 
sustainability reports is associated with increased sustainability restatements. We also 
document that SRA is more strongly associated with restatements due to errors than to 
methodological updates. Further, and contrary to Moroney and Trotman’s (2016) assertion 
that SRA providers will not consider audit differences below five percent as material, our 
findings document the presence of restatements even for substantially non-material amounts 
(we find restatements for values as low as 0.02%). Importantly, from a legitimacy-building 
perspective, we find assurance is significantly related to the disclosure of quantitatively non-
material restatements. Finally, while our results indicate both professional accountants and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
previous reports should be reported by SRA providers; and that they are currently convening a working group 
to develop an updated standard. 
4 Our sample differs substantially from KPMG (2013). See our online supplemental material for a reconciliation 
between the KPMG sample and ours. We reprinted/compiled from The KPMG Survey of Corporate 
Responsibility Reporting 2013, Copyright: © 2013 KPMG International Cooperative (“KPMG International”), 
a Swiss entity. All rights reserved.  
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consultants may be using restatements to build legitimacy for their services, the findings also 
reveal important differences across SRA providers that may influence the actual or perceived 
credibility of information. We document the likelihood of restatements due to methodological 
updates and of non-material amounts relates only to consultant assurance, suggesting the two 
players in this market demonstrate the legitimacy of their services using different expertise 
claims. We interpret this finding as evidence that legitimation of professional superiority 
gains complexity within the SRA arena due to the interprofessional competition between the 
two main participants, accounting and consulting firms. Hence, we provide insight into the 
ways each party competes to create legitimacy by both assimilating each other’s skills 
(Abbott 1988), and exploiting their own strength/skill set (Farooq & De Villiers, 2017; 
Huggins, Green, & Simnett, 2011; Pflugrath, Roebuck & Simnett, 2011; Simnett, Vanstraelen 
et al., 2009).  
All results are robust to a series of additional tests, including a propensity score 
matching design to minimize the degree of observable heterogeneity between firms seeking 
assurance and those that do not, consideration of litigation risk, peer effects, and extended 
assurance tenure. We also provide evidence that restatements are not associated with SRA 
provider turnover, while they are significantly related to increases in the number of new 
clients, in line with our arguments that they contribute to legitimacy-building in the assurance 
market. Overall, our findings suggest sustainability restatements differ from financial 
restatements, and that, although potentially indicating improved reporting, sustainability 
restatements may be part of the SRA provider strategy to increase the perceived value of their 
services. 
Our study provides several contributions. First, whereas prior investigations of SRA 
mainly explore the determinants of the choice to obtain assurance considering institutional, 
organizational, and governance characteristics (e.g. Beets & Souther, 1999; Cho et al., 2014; 
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GRI, 2013; Hodge et al., 2009; Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett, Vanstraelen, et al., 2009), we 
focus on a potential strategy used by SRA providers to develop legitimacy in a new arena 
(Gendron & Barrett, 2004; O’Dwyer, 2011; Power 1997; 2003).  Further, while previous 
studies (e.g., O’Dwyer et al., 2011) explore the process of establishing legitimacy within the 
SRA arena, we more carefully identify how legitimation tactics appear to vary across the 
differing provider types, at least in the U.S. setting where SRA remains an underdeveloped 
and potentially lucrative market. These findings contribute to the theory of 
professionalization by providing an empirical illustration of the use of a professional task to 
create legitimacy within a space lacking stringent regulation. We also enhance the theoretical 
framework of professionalization by showing that professional tasks not only change as a 
consequence of competition and the professional environment, but that professional groups 
have the ability to capture a task, participate in diametrically altering its meaning within 
society, and use this newly defined task to create legitimacy. In the SRA arena, restatements 
do not mirror the negative connotations they hold within the financial audit context, but 
instead are used successfully to improve market share. In addition, we offer a different 
perspective from Moroney and Trotman (2016) by providing archival evidence of a 
discrepancy between the materiality thresholds used by professional accounting firms and 
consulting firms. Finally, our study contributes to the understanding of consultant assurer 
behavior less explored in prior literature, particularly within the accounting domain. 
Our findings relating to the differing materiality thresholds across service providers 
have implications for regulators and standard setters, who in recent years have widely 
addressed the issue of the credibility of sustainability reporting (IAASB, 2016; AICPA, 
2016; WBCSB, 2016; GRI, 2011, 2013; GSSB, 2015; IFAC, 2015). Furthermore, our 
evidence is important for accounting bodies such as the Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board (SASB) and the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), as they 
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focus on defining materiality within sustainability reporting (SASB, 2016; IFAC, 2015) 
and the London-based Institute of Social and Ethical AccountAbility (AccountAbility), as 
they have recently convened a working group to develop the next version of the AA1000 
assurance standard for non-accountants. 
Finally, our research is important for the broad range of users of sustainability reports. 
While academic research provides evidence of a monitoring role for sustainability reports 
(Lu, Shailer, & Yu, 2017) and that sustainability information is value relevant across the 
world (e.g. Cahan, De Villiers, Jeter, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2016), we document that these 
reports may contain material restatements, the effects of which are not clear. At the same 
time, knowing that restated information within sustainability reports is often non-material, 
users should question the purpose of these restatements. More broadly, our results also call 
into question whether restatements are merely a vehicle to create an image that assurance 
provides value to the reporting process, rather than an actual attempt at transparency and 
accountability to stakeholders. Understanding this issue is critical as stakeholders 
increasingly demand sustainability data and desire that the information be credible for 
decision making (O’Dwyer et al., 2005; Reimsbach, Hahn, & Gürtürk, 2017). 
Background and Hypotheses Development 
Theory of Professionalization and Legitimacy-Building in New Assurance Markets 
While most studies on the development and evolution of professional space in assurance 
tend to examine only traditional financial auditing (e.g., Coronella, Sargiacomo, & Walker, 
2015; Jeppesen & Loft, 2011), we explore the issue relative to SRA. Due to its voluntary 
nature and relatively unregulated status (Boiral & Gendron, 2011), as well as the significantly 
high cost to clients (Crespin, 2012), SRA development and expansion as a profit-driver is 
subject to practitioners’ success in creating demand for their services (Power, 2003). The 
theory of professionalization establishes that developing professional legitimacy is central to 
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controlling an emerging professional space (Abbott, 1988). In order for SRA providers to 
capture the largest market share in a new area, they must create legitimacy for both their 
service and their particular expertise to provide that service (Power, 1997; 2003). Thus, 
especially in new areas where techniques have not been realized, assurance is a social 
construction, requiring elaborate forms of image management (Abbott, 1988; Power, 2003).  
Prior literature provides examples of intentional behavior on the part of SRA providers to 
create an image to both the client and to external parties regarding the legitimacy of SRA 
services. For example, O’Dwyer et al. (2011) interview practitioners in the sustainability 
assurance division of a Big 4 professional services firm and find that SRA providers 
intentionally illustrate the poor quality of their clients’ sustainability data to management in 
order to create legitimacy for SRA services (i.e. client-focused legitimacy-building). 
O’Dwyer et al. also provide evidence of external or market-based legitimacy-building 
strategies focused on external parties. In response to concerns of a lack of stakeholder 
responsiveness to SRA reports, assurance providers altered wording of the assurance 
statements within the reports.  
Abbott (1988) argues that creating legitimacy in a new professional space requires 
professional groups to define a problem, reason about it, and to provide a measurable, public 
solution. We propose that formal restatements may be used by SRA providers to enhance the 
legitimacy of their services by conveying to both the market and the client that SRA is the 
measurable solution to the problem of inaccurate or unreliable data within the reports (Power, 
2003). It is important to stress the distinction between prior sustainability literature relying on 
legitimacy theory as explaining firms’ choices to disclose certain types of information (e.g., 
Cho, 2009) and the theory of professionalization, where professionals attempt legitimacy-
building to gain access and market share in a new assurance arena (O’Dwyer et al., 2011; 
Power, 1997; 2003). Suchman (1995, p. 587) notes that “legitimacy building is generally a 
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proactive enterprise,” and that “innovators who depart from prior practice must often 
intervene preemptively . . . to develop bases of support” (p. 591). Suchman further asserts 
that pragmatic legitimacy, legitimacy based on constituencies’ perceptions of the practical 
consequences to them from an organization’s actions, is the easiest type of legitimacy to 
manipulate. He refers to this type of manipulation as a form of advertising, whereby the 
“organization attempts to persuade particular exchange partners to value particular offerings” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 591). In our setting, SRA providers may use restatements as a way to 
initially build pragmatic legitimacy for their services with the goal of expanding market share 
within the evolving assurance arena. 
It is also important to acknowledge that the SRA market includes two main professional 
groups, auditing firms and consultants (e.g. Perego & Kolk 2012, O’Dwyer & Owen 2005; 
O’Dwyer et al. 2011; Manetti & Becatti 2009; Simnett, Vanstraelen et al. 2009; Simnett, 
Nugent, et al., 2009; Casey & Grenier 2015; Peters & Romi 2015). Prior literature argues that 
accounting providers have an advantage with respect to providing high quality assurance 
given the profession’s body of international standards, ethics, independence, and control 
mechanisms (Pflugrath et al., 2011). In contrast, consulting firms possess significant 
sustainability expertise but are subject to different standards of professional conduct and 
independence than the accounting profession (Huggins et al. 2011). However, the 
assimilation between accountant and consultant assurance providers has increased, largely 
because the assurance standards each group relies on have become more aligned over time. 
The ISAE 30005 assurance standard, developed by the International Auditing and Assurance 
Standards Board (IAASB), provides guidance for professional accountants when conducting 
non-financial assurance engagements (IAASB 2003). The AA1000 Assurance Standard 
(AA1000AS), developed by AccountAbility, regulates the consulting profession and provides 
                                                        
5 Assurance Engagements Other Than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial Information. 
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similar guidance toward SRA engagements. Both standards provide guidance on accepting 
and performing an engagement, the need for independence and competence, the use of 
materiality, and the importance of evidence gathering to support reliability and accuracy, 
among other issues. Neither standard discusses restatements, but professional accountants do 
have more specific experience with restatements within their financial statement auditing 
practices. The main difference between the standards lies in the SRA providers’ opinion and 
reporting. Professional accountants are more likely to provide limited levels of assurance and 
may be narrowly focused on assuring only those items which fit nicely into their 
conventional financial accounting testing procedures (i.e. numerical indicators) (O’Dywer 
2011). Additionally, their SRA services result in significantly greater costs to the assurance 
purchaser. Consultants, on the other hand, are more likely to provide higher levels of 
assurance and focus more on providing value to the organization through recommendations 
for improvements in systems and reporting (Mock, Rao & Srivastava, 2013). Given that both 
groups rely on similar standards, but possess different expert skills, differences in the use of 
restatements to establish legitimacy might exist across provider types.  
Of course, the interpretation of restatements as building legitimacy stands in clear 
contrast to restatements in financial reporting where restatements reflect negatively on the 
audit provider (e.g., Brocard, Franke, & Voeller, 2017). In the financial reporting domain, 
research documents that audit tools and techniques allow for the discovery of financial 
reporting problems prior to filing, improving the quality of reporting and avoiding 
restatements in later years (e.g. Palmrose & Scholz, 2004). In contrast, a number of factors 
unique to the SRA arena suggest mistakes are more likely to be made, and less likely to be 
discovered before reporting, even when SRA is present. The whole of these factors 
potentially lends to SRA providers’ ability to use restatements to indicate a positive solution 
to a public concern about the reporting quality of sustainability information.  
12 
 
The Unique Nature of Sustainability Restatements in Relation to SRA 
Prior financial accounting literature indicates that the detection of current period errors 
is more difficult when the reporting and assurance standards are not well defined (Plumlee & 
Yohn, 2010). In sustainability reporting, there is ambiguity in both the reporting and in the 
assurance standards (Boiral & Gendron, 2011; IAASB, 2016). Further, the transposition of 
financial auditing practices by professional accountants in the presence of these immature 
reporting and assurance standards (Moroney & Trotman, 2016), as well as the development 
of assurance concepts by sustainability consultants not trained in attestation methods, results 
in a substantial learning curve (O’Dwyer, 2011). More specifically within accounting firm 
providers, transposition becomes even more difficult in the face of low levels of 
sustainability assurance knowledge and high turnover rates among personnel. Anecdotal 
evidence from discussions with leading SRA providers indicates that accountants, trained to 
assure financial statements, often find it very difficult to switch over to more challenging 
engagements where they likely do not have knowledge of the subject matter (also see 
Delfgaauw, 2000). Further, as knowledge and skills are developed, individuals within the 
organization often move on to other positions, and the replacement auditors must build that 
knowledge again. Consultants, on the other hand, do not have the same professional 
assurance skill set, specifically with respect to error detection during engagement activities, 
found in the accounting profession, and there may accordingly be less expectation for the 
discovery of errors by these assurors. 
In addition to these factors, detection of errors increasingly becomes difficult because of 
the limited level of assurance, particularly on the part of accounting firm providers 
(O’Dwyer, 2011; IAASB, 2016; Perego & Kolk, 2012), and the under-developed or non-
existent internal sustainability reporting systems and internal control systems associated with 
sustainability reporting of report-issuing firms (IAASB, 2016). Limited assurance reduces 
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engagement risk to a level greater than reasonable assurance and provides for significantly 
less evidence gathering in terms of amount and quality than reasonable assurance (IAASB, 
2013), contributing to difficulties in discovering errors prior to reporting. Further, with less 
precise auditing standards compared to financial audits (Boiral & Gendron, 2011), there is 
less regulatory scrutiny (Moroney & Trotman, 2016), resulting in a lower risk to reputational 
harm from assurance results historically perceived as indicating poor audit effort (i.e. 
restatements).  
While we argue the SRA provider is the legitimacy-building strategist involved in the 
SRA engagement, restatements can also offer clients two potential benefits. First, a 
restatement provides clients the ability to convey to the public that they are attempting to be 
transparent and accurate with their information. This argument supports Malsch’s (2013) 
assessment that reputational risk – in our setting associated with inaccurate sustainability 
information – is managed and converted “as an opportunity provided it is located within the 
instrumental, demanding but legitimate market relationship between organizations and their 
consumers” (Malsch, 2013, p. 157). Second, restatements provide the client the ability to 
demonstrate to top management the need for (or continuation of) assurance services based on 
the existence of inaccurate data. Accordingly, the use of restatements as an audit legitimacy-
building tool may co-produce legitimacy for both the auditor and the client (Power, 2003), 
although clients may need to be convinced of the benefits during auditor-client negotiations.  
 Assurance Provider and Client Negotiations 
Evidence indicates that, when reporting standards are complex and reputation is 
important, auditors and clients are more likely to discuss and negotiate on issues both in the 
financial (Gibbins, McCracken, & Salterio, 2007) and sustainability reporting arenas 
(Moroney & Trotman, 2016; O’Dwyer et al., 2011). Central to these negotiations are the 
client’s beliefs about an accounting issue’s consequences to themselves and the auditor’s 
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beliefs about the consequences to the auditor, among others. In relation to sustainability 
reporting, both the lack of reporting standards and the importance of reputation for both the 
provider and the client are present, increasing the likelihood that the mutual benefits from 
disclosing restatements are discussed. Prior auditor-client negotiation research (e.g. Salterio, 
2012) reveals that after the discovery of mistakes in reporting, the assurance provider and the 
client will discuss the mistake and how it ultimately should be handled. O’Dwyer et al. 
(2011) provide evidence of the assurance provider-client negotiation process in SRA, and 
document intentional SRA provider legitimizing strategies through discussions with clients.  
Hypotheses 
Given the difficulty in discovering errors prior to reporting, the decreased liability 
associated with SRA engagements due to a lack of clear reporting standards and ambiguous 
SRA guidelines, and prior evidence of negotiations between SRA providers and clients, we 
argue that restatements can be used in an attempt to highlight the legitimacy of the SRA 
provider while also benefiting the clients, rendering a positive relationship between SRA and 
restatements. Although it is plausible that firms without assurance may also disclose 
restatements,6 we posit that the mutually beneficial legitimation associated with restatements 
ultimately leads to a greater likelihood of sustainability restatements in the presence of SRA. 
Accordingly, we anticipate a greater prevalence of restatements in reports with assurance, 
and we formally state our hypothesis in the alternative form: 
H1: The likelihood of having a sustainability restatement is positively associated with the 
presence of SRA. 
 
Type of Restatements and SRA 
Prior financial reporting research argues it is important to distinguish between 
restatements due to errors and those due to irregularities because investors and regulators 
                                                        
6 In our discussions with SRA providers, they noted, for example, that some firms without assurance invite 
stakeholders or advisory groups to provide feedback on their reports, potentially leading to restatements of 
data. Similarly, other firms rely on their own internal auditing departments to assess the SRA reports, again 
leading to the potential for restatements. 
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view irregularities as more severe (e.g. Hennes, Leone, & Miller, 2008; Lobo & Zhao, 2013). 
Similarly, within the sustainability reporting realm, there appear to be two distinct types of 
sustainability restatements. KPMG (2013) indicates that, among the largest 100 corporations 
globally, 21 percent of restatements were due to errors (down from 29 percent in 2011), while 
79 percent were due to methodological updates (improved methods, updates of scopes, or 
definitions at 33, 20, and 26 percent respectively).7  
Restatements due to errors imply a problem within the reporting system (i.e. inaccurate 
information) while methodological updates have a current period impact that could not have 
been predicted when prior reports were released (methods change between the reporting 
years and resulting changes in data are subsequently disclosed for consistency purposes). 
While the nature of these types of restatements differs, this analysis allows us to distinguish 
between the possibility that a positive relationship between SRA and restatements reflects a 
legitimacy-building strategy or the possibility of a learning curve as presented by O’Dwyer 
(2011).   
Methodological updates likely demonstrate improvements being made as a result of SRA 
efforts (KPMG, 2011) and reflect the ‘learning curve’ of the SRA process as discussed by 
O’Dwyer (2011). There would appear to be little risk of harm to either the assurance provider 
or the client firm from disclosures of restatements due to methodological updates. In contrast, 
restatements due to errors in prior reporting could reflect poorly on prior assurance efforts at 
a potential cost to assurance providers. On the other hand, assurance providers could believe 
restatements related to errors demonstrate that, in the face of significant challenges to 
reporting and SRA as discussed above, assurance is an important and successful treatment for 
the risk of misstated information within sustainability reports, and therefore a more powerful 
legitimacy-building tactic than disclosure of methodological restatements. If restatements are 
                                                        
7 As we identify below, we find that error restatements are more prevalent in our sample of U.S. company 
sustainability reports. We do not explore in this study what may be driving the difference, but we discuss 
reconciliation of our findings with those by KPMG (2013) in our online supplemental material. 
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in fact a legitimacy-building tool, we expect SRA to be positively associated with both 
methodological and error restatements, but anticipate the relationship will be stronger for the 
latter. We formally state this hypothesis as: 
H2: The association between SRA and sustainability restatements is greater for errors than 
for methodological updates. 
 
Materiality of Restatements and SRA  
 Materiality has long been considered an important factor when examining financial 
auditing practice (Eilifsen & Messier, 2015; Messier, 1983; Messier, Mortinov-Bennie, & 
Eilifsen, 2005), 8 but has only recently been considered in relation to SRA (Moroney & 
Trotman, 2016). Moroney and Trotman (2016) engage 82 Big 4 audit managers to examine 
their materiality assessment decisions under a financial versus water engagement. 
Participants were asked whether failure to correct an audit difference of 6.6 percent9 (of 
relevant base) would render the statement/report materially misstated. Results indicate 
auditors are more likely to consider the audit difference material in the financial statement 
audit than in the water assurance engagement. There are two main reasons for this difference. 
First, Moroney and Trotman (2016) argue that auditors are less likely to have to justify 
waiving an audit difference above five percent on a SRA engagement because of the 
ambiguity in materiality threshold. Second, when guidelines are ambiguous, there are fewer 
incentives for auditors to demonstrate due care by being more conservative. However, if SRA 
providers are attempting to build legitimacy for their services using restatements, we argue 
they will take advantage of all opportunities to restate information and will include 
restatements even when the amounts appear to be quantitatively non-material. Although 
                                                        
8 Within a sustainability-reporting context, the size of the restatement is not a complete proxy for the materiality 
of the restatement. The GRI defines materiality along two lines: influence on stakeholders’ assessments and 
decisions and significance of the impact. Because we are aware that the first dimension is sovereign to the 
principle of materiality, we also acknowledge the impossibility, within our archival approach, to assess it. 
Thus, if anything, the size of the error restatement is only an approximation of the significance of the impact.  
9 Moroney and Trotman (2016) note that five percent of profits before taxes is the most common materiality 
threshold in financial statement audits (Eilifsen & Messier, 2015; Libby & Brown, 2013; Messier et al., 2005), 
and they argue using an amount below the five percent threshold ran the risk of being considered non-material 
no matter the qualitative factors presented. 
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focusing on environmental disclosure as opposed to restatements, Cho, Freedman, and Patten 
(2012) document that a substantial number of U.S. companies operating in environmentally 
sensitive industries disclose non-material levels of environmental capital expenditures and 
that the practice appears to be driven by attempts at legitimation. Relative to report-issuing 
firms without assurance, therefore, we expect to find a greater prevalence of non-material 
restatements where assurance is present. We state this hypothesis as: 
H3: The likelihood of having a non-material sustainability restatement is positively 
associated with SRA.  
 
Sustainability Restatements and SRA providers 
 Differences across accountant and consultant assurance providers (O’Dwyer et al., 2005; 
O’Dwyer, 2011) may lead to differences when attempting to claim the SRA jurisdiction. 
Prior research on the influence of “expertise” in a given assurance arena indicates claims of 
expertise are not purely technical, but instead are developed to support the intentions of some 
parties over others (Power, 1997; Gendron, Cooper, & Townley, 2007; Malsch, 2013). 
Additionally, with growing similarities between assurance guidelines between professional 
accountants and consultants, the less restrictive overall set of standards for consultants (i.e. 
professional accountants are also guided by their experience with more stringent financial 
statement auditing standards) may also allow consultants more freedom in the use of 
restatements toward legitimacy. Relatedly, Moroney and Trotman (2016) call for research 
examining the differences in outcomes between SRA provider types. Restatements may be a 
way of differentiating SRA value and building legitimacy in the market by one provider type 
at the expense of another.   
On the other hand, if both professional accountants and consultants are attempting to 
gain control of the SRA market in its early stages of development, they may both utilize 
restatements as a legitimizing tactic. In this case, there should be no difference in the 
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probability of restatements across provider types. However, it is also possible that the nature 
and materiality of restatements is affected by the type of SRA provider because of differing 
expertise, professional background, and the restrictiveness of assurance standard sets. 
Without prior literature to distinguish whether different parties attempting to create 
legitimacy in the same arena will employ similar tactics, we adopt an exploratory approach 
and provide the following null hypothesis: 
H4: The association between the likelihood of having a sustainability restatement and SRA 
does not vary with the type of SRA provider 
 
Research Method 
Sample and Data Collection 
In line with the theory of professionalization, the maturing SRA market within the U.S. 
provides a unique setting to gain an understanding of sustainability restatements and their use 
to develop and promote expertise claims in a market with significant untapped SRA service 
capacity. Thus, we select our sample from S&P 500 firms over the period 2010–14.10 Similar 
to prior research, we identify stand-alone sustainability reports using Corporate Register and 
a review of corporate websites (Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett, Vanstraelen, et al. 2009). 
Table 1, Panel A provides the sample selection,11 and Panel B indicates the distribution of 
sustainability reports over our sample period. The sample appears to be consistently 
distributed over time.  
***Insert Table 1 Here*** 
For the purposes of our paper, we define a sustainability restatement as occurring when a 
firm discloses in the current report that a previous report had an error or omission or that the 
current report’s data is not consistent with the previous report due to methodological updates. 
                                                        
10 With respect to our time period, we rely on the most recent reports available at the time of our data collection, 
collecting back to 2010. Using data prior to 2010 is problematic given the reduced availability of voluntary 
sustainability reports and the minimal use of restatements prior to that time period. 
11 We considered all firms appearing in the S&P 500 listing for at least one year during the sample period. We 
then included those firms in all four years, resulting in 2,817 initial observations.  
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KPMG (2011, 2013) also examines restatements, but instead uses four categories: (1) updates 
or improved methodology, (2) updates of definitions, (3) updates to scope, and (4) errors or 
emissions. We found much of the discussion to KPMG’s 1, 2, and 3 to be similar in nature, 
therefore, we combined all of those categories into our ‘methodological update’ category, 
which includes things such as increased data availability, changes in reporting scope, and 
changes in guidelines. Consistent with KPMG (2011; 2013), we did not consider restatements 
due to acquisitions/divestitures as restating firms in our sample.  
We follow a stringent process to identify the existence of restatements in sustainability 
reports. We first examined a sub-sample of 50 reports to become familiar with commonly 
used terminology associated with restatements. Using a self-created database of these 
common words, we next employed PERL12 to search each of our sample sustainability 
reports for mention of any form of: restat*, correct*, updat*, or revis* (e.g. restate, restated, 
restatement, etc.). PERL captured the paragraph surrounding those particular words, where 
present, and for each restatement detected13, we collected additional information from the 
sustainability report itself. This information included the type of restatement (e.g., correction 
of error or methodological update), size of the restatement (i.e. materiality), and the type of 
data being restated (e.g. environmental). As illustrated in the restatement reported by Baxter 
in 2011 (see online supplemental material), changes in restated data can be significant. In 
addition, we collected report-level data with respect to whether GRI was followed and the 
number of pages in the report. We also relied on PERL to determine the instances of 
assurance. We searched each sustainability report for any form of the words: assur*, verif*, 
                                                        
12 Practical Extraction and Reporting Language (PERL) is a programming language designed to manipulate and 
analyze text documents that enables, among other functions, extracting excerpts from those text files and 
printing reports based on that information.  
13 As a check to our procedure, we manually reviewed the majority of the sustainability reports in our sample for 
both restatements and assurance and found no cases where the PERL search failed to identify their existence.. 
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accur*, or audit. Where PERL detected assurance, we manually collected information about 
the assurance and the provider.14  
The Relationship between Assurance and Restatements 
We use the following logistic regression model to investigate how SRA relates to the 
likelihood of having restatements disclosed in a particular firm-year report:  
Restatementi,t = β0+β1Assurancei,t + β2GRIi,t + β3Report Sizei,t  + β4Firm Sizei,t-1 + 
β5Sustainability Performancei,t-1 + β6ROAi,t-1 + β7LEVi,t-1 + β8ESSIi + Year fixed effects  
We estimate this model using five alternative measures for restatements. First, we employ a 
dummy variable (Restatement) equal to 1 if the firm discloses at least one restatement (of any 
type) in its stand-alone sustainability report for the year, and 0 otherwise. Next, we classify 
our dependent variable based on the two types of restatements and code the variable 1 where 
the report contains at least one restatement due to error (methodological update), and 0 
otherwise. Finally, we also consider the materiality (non-materiality) of the restatement, and 
code our dependent variable 1 if the report contains a restatement where the difference in the 
current report is greater (less) than five percent of the originally reported information, and 0 
otherwise.15 We also use an indicator variable for our primary test metric, Assurance, and 
code as 1 firm-year observations where the sustainability report includes external SRA.  
                                                        
14 We note some variation in assurance levels in our sample. We have 59 instances where the level of assurance 
engagement is not specified, and of the remaining 231 engagements, 179 are limited, 23 are moderate and 29 
are reasonable. Un-tabulated analysis shows that the likelihood of restatements is positively associated with 
the presence of limited and reasonable assurance, but not associated with moderate assurance. Instances of 
moderate and reasonable assurance are almost completely limited to consultants and likely indicate the same 
level as limited assurance for professional accountants. Dow’s 2013 Sustainability Report addresses this very 
issue, “In terms of the level of assurance the Company notes that ‘limited’ as used by ISAE3000 is equivalent 
to ‘moderate’ in 1000AS so that this report has a consistent level of assurance as the reports in previous years” 
(Dow, 2013, p. 43). This makes it difficult to properly determine the assurance level for anything other than 
limited assurance, which should be consistent across SRA provider types. 
15 Five percent appears to be an acceptable threshold for sustainability reporting as this amount is listed within 
several sustainability reports in reference to restating information. For example, 3M’s sustainability report 
states, “In every case, 3M adjusts base-year and other years’ data if data collection methods change or data 
errors are identified. Any significant changes in the measurement methods and/or data values applied to key 
environmental metrics from previous years are documented within the report. Significant changes are defined 
by 3M’s Sustainability Report as changes greater than 5 percent of the original data point.” (3M, 2014, p. 
138). Another example includes Carnival Corp’s report stating, “We adjust data if data collection methods 
change or data errors are identified. Any significant changes in the measurement methods and/or data values 
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We include a number of control variables to capture other potential drivers of 
restatements both at the report and firm level. At the report level, GRI is an indicator variable 
capturing whether the report follows the GRI guidelines, since the GRI recommends to 
disclose methodological updates for comparability purposes. We also include Report Size, 
measured as the number of pages within the report (Loughran & McDonald, 2014), as a 
proxy for the extensiveness of reporting since providing more disclosures increases the 
probability of making mistakes or being impacted by changing methodologies. 
We draw firm-level controls from prior research on both SRA and financial restatements. 
We include Firm Size, measured as the natural log of total sales to control for the size of the 
firm since literature finds that the size of the firm influences the probability of sustainability 
reporting and SRA (Casey & Grenier, 2015; KPMG, 2013; Peters & Romi, 2015; Simnett, 
Vanstraelen, et al., 2009), as well as having an impact on auditor liability and, by extension, 
materiality assessments (Moroney & Trotman, 2016). Poorly performing firms likely face 
greater pressures for sustainability information and more heightened stakeholder awareness 
concerning the reliability of their disclosures. We thus include the control Sustainability 
Performance. We retrieve sustainability performance data from the KLD database. Because 
poor performers might face greater exposure to the public (Cho & Patten, 2007), we measure 
sustainability performance as the total concerns score. Importantly, in addition to social and 
environmental concerns, this measure also captures governance concerns16.  
Prior literature finds that financial performance and risk are associated with financial 
restatements, thus we include ROA and LEV. Finally, firms in environmental and socially 
sensitive industries endure greater political and social pressures related to sustainability 
                                                                                                                                                                            
applied to key metrics from previous years are documented within the report. Significant changes are defined 
as changes greater than 5% of the original data point.” (Carnival Corp, 2014, p. 10). As a sensitivity check, we 
repeat all of our analyses using a 10 percent change classification and find that results (un-tabulated) are 
consistent with those using the five percent cut-off. 
16  KLD concerns indicate the presence of weaknesses in seven areas: environment, community, corporate 
governance, diversity, employee relations, human rights, and product responsibility. 
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issues and thus may face greater need for reporting accurate information. We employ a 
dummy variable (ESSI) identifying firms whose primary operations are in an environmental 
or socially sensitive industry. We classify companies from the chemical, mining, metals, 
paper, petroleum, and utility industries as environmentally sensitive (Cho & Patten, 2007) 
and we also include pharmaceutical, alcoholic beverage, and defense industry firms in this 
classification due to higher levels of social exposure (Brammer & Millington, 2005). Finally, 
we control for year fixed effects and provide robust standard errors, clustering by firm.17 
Appendix 1 summarizes all variable definitions. 
To examine for potential differences across SRA provider type, we estimate our logistic 
regressions replacing the assurance variable with separate assurance provider type variables, 
Consultant and Accounting firm, measured as a 1 if the firm purchases external SRA from a 
consultant or an accounting firm, respectively.  
Results 
Overall, we identify 307 restatements, of which 196 are errors and 111 are 
methodological updates. Due to the restatement pervasiveness (some firms reported more 
than one restatement in a given year), our total sample originates from only 177 unique 
reports. As summarized in Table 2, restatements per year increases over our period of 
investigation, ranging from 10.39 percent of reports with a restatement in 2010 to 21.14 
percent of such reports in 2014. This trend provides additional support for the importance of 
examining this phenomenon within the U.S. setting. Un-tabulated results indicate that most of 
the restatements relate to environmental (286 restatements) as opposed to social (35 
restatements) data. Within the environmental category, companies restated greenhouse gas 
emissions data most often (38.6 percent), followed by energy (17.4 percent), waste (10.0 
percent), and water (7.8 percent) data. The vast majority of restated social data (65.7 percent 
                                                        
17 Continuous control variables (size, ROA and leverage) are winsorized at the 1% level.   
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of the restatements) involved employee indicators related to health and safety issues (accident 
rates).  
***Insert Table 2 Here*** 
Table 3, Panel A provides the breakdown of assurance and restatement within our 
sample reports. Overall, 290 reports (24.2 percent) included assurance, and assurance by 
consultant (n = 226) is more common than assurance by accounting firms (n = 64). Focusing 
on restatement type, 116 reports disclosed at least one restatement due to error and 72 reports 
had a restatement due to a methodological update (some reports have both an error and a 
methodological update, therefore the sum is greater than reports with at least one 
restatement). We also find 85 (98) reports disclosing a restatement greater (less) than five 
percent, including restatements as low as 0.02% of underlying base. The size of the 
restatement is not reported in 39 cases, and as such, the number of observations for the 
materiality tests drops from 1,200 to 1,161.  
Table 3, Panel B presents a comparison of the prevalence of sustainability restatements 
across assured and non-assured reports. In each case, the proportion of sample reports 
containing the specific restatement of interest is larger for the assurance sub-sample of firms 
than for the non-assured counterparts, and results of Chi-squared tests indicate the differences 
in proportions across these groups is statistically significant (at p < .001, one-tailed).  
***Insert Table 3 Here*** 
Table 4, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for control variables used in our 
multivariate analysis. As indicated, 52.3 percent of reports follow GRI guidelines, and 28.7 
percent of the observations come from firms in socially or environmentally sensitive 
industries. On average, the reports are approximately 59 pages in length, but vary across a 
wide range (min = 2, max = 581). As expected given our focus on S&P 500 companies, firms 
are relatively large and profitable. Sustainability performance scores range from zero to 18, 
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with a mean of 3.093. Table 4, Panel B reports the correlation analysis and provides 
preliminary evidence that restatements are positively associated with SRA. 
 ***Insert Table 4 Here*** 
Table 5 provides the results of our logistic regression analyses when considering the 
likelihood of disclosing any type of restatement (column 1), errors (column 2), 
methodological updates (column 3), material (column 4), and non-material (column 5) 
restatements. We find that SRA is positively and significantly related to the likelihood of a 
restatement (at p < .01), supporting H118. This result, in combination with the results in 
columns 2, 3, and 5 provide support to our argument that sustainability restatements are a 
legitimizing tactic. Specifically, while SRA is positively and significantly related to the 
likelihood of both an error restatement (at p < .01) and a restatement due to methodological 
update (at p < 0.10), the coefficient on Assurance is significantly larger in magnitude for the 
error restatement regression model. Specifically, the odds of disclosing an error for firms 
with SRA (un-tabulated) are about 3.77 times higher than the odds for firms without SRA, 
while the odds of disclosing a restatement due to a methodological update for firms with SRA 
are only 1.72 times higher than the odds for firms without SRA. This supports H2. Further, 
the results reported in column 5 provide evidence on H3. SRA is positively associated with 
non-material restatements, and the odds of disclosing such a restatement are 2.80 times (un-
tabulated) higher when assurance is present than when it is not. The finding that assurance is 
associated with non-material restatements suggests SRA providers see benefit in restating 
insignificant amounts, which, we argue, is consistent with attempts at building professional 
legitimacy. Finally, although not part of our hypothesis tests, the results presented in column 
4 indicate material restatements are also significantly associated with the presence of SRA. 
                                                        
18 We note that for the 99 reports with restatements and assurance, we have 72 instances where the indicators 
being restated are specifically assured within the report and 25 restatements that instead relate to indicators 
that are not assured within the report (in two cases we were not able to assess whether the specific item being 
restated is covered by assurance). 
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With respect to the control variables, we find that both the extensiveness of reporting 
(Report Size) and the use of the GRI increase the likelihood of restatements of all types, 
where we find that the size of the firm is only significant when we analyze error restatements. 
Additionally, higher leveraged firms are statistically less likely to report methodological 
updates. Our ESSI variable is not significant in any model specifications. 
***Insert Table 5 Here*** 
Table 6 reports the analysis for H4. Column 1 indicates that the likelihood of disclosing 
any restatement is positively associated with SRA provided by both consultants and 
accounting firms. Furthermore, the two coefficients are not statistically different from one 
another (un-tabulated), indicating that both types of SRA providers are equally likely to 
support the use of restatements. However, examination of the nature and materiality of 
restatements reveals important differences. First, while the likelihood of disclosing errors is 
positively (and equally) associated with both SRA provider types, the likelihood of disclosing 
a restatement due to methodological updates is only statistically significant for consultant 
providers. This may be an indication of the learning curve as proposed by O’Dwyer (2011) 
and KPMG (2011). On the other hand, this could also indicate the expertise claims of one 
party against another (Abbott, 1988; Malsch, 2013; Power, 1997). As these two parties try to 
gain control of the SRA market within the U.S., the need to claim expertise in SRA grows 
and consultants could be using methodological updates to identify a problem and a solution, 
where professional accountants, restricted more by their historical financial statement 
assurance standards, use errors. However, the relatively low level of significance (< .10, two-
tailed) suggests such an interpretation is speculative as opposed to absolute. 
Second, in contrast to firms with consultant assurance, firms with SRA provided by 
accounting firms are not more likely to disclose a non-material restatement than firms 
without assurance. This likely reflects the restrictive differences in SRA standard sets 
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between the two parties. While both provider assurance standards contain materiality 
guidance, professional accountants face additional historically stable materiality thresholds 
within the financial reporting arena. Less restrictive assurance standards allow consultants to 
use non-material and material restatements similarly. These two results, in combination, 
suggest the use of different expertise claims of one party versus the other within the SRA 
arena in the U.S.19  
***Insert Table 6 Here*** 
Additional Analysis20 
Ruling out alternative explanations 
Given that SRA is voluntary, we acknowledge that our models may suffer from self-
selection bias. In order to minimize the degree of observable heterogeneity between firms 
with and without SRA, we employ a propensity score matching design (Blundell & Costa-
Dias, 2009). We thus obtain a sub-sample of firms in which the treated (assurance) and the 
control group are as comparable as possible on a number of observable characteristics.21 We 
select matching variables using Peters and Romi’s (2015) model for determinants of 
assurance (see Appendix 1 for variable descriptions). We match each firm to the closest 
(caliper 0.03) neighbor with no replacement. The sample is reduced to 372 (186) total 
(treated, i.e. with assurance) firm-year observations. Table 7, Panel A reports the means for 
the treated and control group for each of the covariates included in the propensity score 
                                                        
19 We also analyze whether the effects of assurance differ in relation to instances of restatements negatively 
impacting prior performance (e.g. restated greenhouse gas emissions where prior reports were understated) 
versus restatements improving prior performance (e.g. restated employee accident rates which were previously 
overstated). Overall, we find that SRA services do not differentiate between the disclosures of positive or 
negative restatements (i.e. are likely to impact both) and that the provider type (accountant versus consultant) 
does not change this result. 
20 For the sake of brevity, not all of the additional tests (presented to the reviewers) are tabulated. 
21 Although propensity score matching does not solve for self-selection bias due to unobservable factors, nor 
does it necessarily solve endogeneity concerns over omitted correlated variables, it deals with the selection 
process by constructing a control group of firms with observable characteristics similar to the treated. In other 
words, it identifies the correct sample counterpart for the missing information on the treated outcomes, had 
they not been treated, by pairing each participant with members of the control group. Under this matching 
assumption, the only remaining difference between the two groups is the SRA adoption.  
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matching. Panel B reports the logistic regressions performed on the propensity scored 
matched sample for all dependent variables and supports the inference of the main analysis in 
that assurance is positively and significantly associated with the presence of restatements, 
errors, methodological updates, material, and non-material restatements for this reduced 
sample.22  
***Insert Table 7 Here*** 
We next consider the effect of first time adoption of assurance vs. continuing assurance 
engagements. Given the difficulties discovering mistakes prior to reporting, if restatements 
help firms and providers create legitimacy for their reporting and services, respectively, we 
would anticipate providers to be motivated to disclose restatements for both initial and 
continuing engagements. We find that first-year SRA is significantly associated with 
restatements of previously reported information, as is continuing SRA (un-tabulated), 
indicating first-time assurance is not driving our results23.  
We further analyze whether concerns with potential litigation could be driving the 
restatement decisions by firms and/or the assurance providers. Hence, we include a litigation 
risk indicator variable and re-estimate regressions using each of our restatement 
classifications. We rely on seven measures for litigation risk, based on prior literature: 
Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper’s (1994) dichotomous measure based on firms in SIC does 
2833-2836, 3570-3577, 7370-7374, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, and 8731-8734, and Kim and 
                                                        
22 We also incorporate a two-stage regression model. For the first stage, we model the likelihood of providing 
SRA following Peters and Romi (2015), with the addition of a firm’s inclusion in a sustainability index. In the 
second stage, the coefficient for assurance remains significant and the Wald test is not significant. 
23 We also run multivariate analyses that consider a change approach for the first-time adoption of GRI vs. 
continuing GRI reporting across various measures of restatements, controlling for both presence of SRA or, 
alternatively, adopting a change approach and controlling for first-time adoption of SRA and continuing SRA 
engagement. While our main evidence on SRA remains unaltered, we find that firms restate in compliance 
with the comparability principle as they continue to report in accordance with the GRI guidelines rather than 
when adopting the GRI. These tests indicate that it is assurance, rather than GRI, that seems to be the main 
driver of our results. Finally, we consider a lagged model, to test the association between the likelihood of 
restating in year t and the presence of assurance in year (t-1). We find this coefficient to be significant and 
positive. However, when we include both the concurrent and lagged variable for assurance, the coefficient of 
the lagged variable is no longer significant, suggesting that it is the presence of assurance in the reporting year 
that drives the disclosure of restatements.  
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Skinner’s (2012) measures associated with future litigation: lagged size, lagged market-
adjusted 12-month stock return, lagged 12-month return skewness, lagged 12-month return 
standard deviation, lagged sales growth, and lagged trading volume turnover. Un-tabulated 
results indicate that the only litigation risk variable systematically associated with 
restatements is return skewness, and, except for the model using methodological updates, 
assurance remains positive and significant. Thus, although we cannot completely rule out the 
possibility that litigation concerns play a role in the restatement decision, our evidence 
suggests this is not the case24.   
Another factor potentially driving our results is mimicking behaviors among peers 
(Boiral & Gendron, 2011; Cormier, Magnan, & Van Velthoven, 2005; Pfarrer, Smith, Bartol, 
Khanin, & Zhan, 2008). We examine this possibility by constructing a variable equal to the 
proportion of peers restating within an industry in the year prior to the restatement. We 
subsequently partition the sample according to whether this variable is equal to or great than 
zero, with High Peer Effects reflecting firms with a larger number of peers providing 
restatements in the prior period. Un-tabulated results indicate no difference in restatement 
behavior across firms facing high or low social forces. All other results remain similar to our 
primary analysis25.   
Impact on the assurance provider 
If restatements lead to negative outcomes for assurance providers, it would be unlikely 
they are seen and used as legitimacy-building tools. We first explore this possibility by 
                                                        
24 To further explore potential assurer concerns regarding litigation risk, we focus on material restatements as 
these would most likely raise litigation issues. We add a high litigation industry risk and assurance interaction 
variable to assess whether the likelihood of having material restatements is greater when assurance is present 
for firms facing higher litigation risk. Un-tabulated results show that neither the litigation risk variable nor the 
interaction term is statistically significant and assurance continues to be positively and significantly associated 
with the restatements. 
25 To further rule out other potential factors we also run models controlling for the presence of financial 
restatements as a proxy for overall reporting quality, a variety of governance factors drawn from Peters and 
Romi (2015), and an alternative classification of industry risk drawn from Simnett, Vanstraelen, et al. (2009). 
In all cases, results remain qualitatively similar to the main analyses. Results also remain comparable when 
models include industry fixed effects, and when we consider separately firms providing SRA for the entire 
report or only over specific items such as environmental metrics. 
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considering the legitimacy of the SRA provider within their existing clients and investigate the 
likelihood to retain the SRA provider in the year following a restatement. We use a one/zero 
indicator variable to identify firm years where a client retains the same assurer from the 
previous report. We regress this variable respectively on the presence of a restatement, error or 
methodological update, and material or non-material restatements. As documented in Table 8, 
Panel A, we find the presence of a restatement in year t-1 is positively associated with the 
likelihood to retain the same SRA provider in year t (column 1). The analyses on more 
specific aspects of the restatements, error versus methodological in column 2, and material 
versus non-material in column 3, show only material restatements as being significantly 
related to retention. However, the lack of a significant negative relation indicates the client is 
not more likely to change provider following any type of restatement. Broadly speaking, these 
findings are contrary to evidence in prior auditing literature where financial restatements are 
associated with auditor turnover, and support our argument that restatements may be used to 
highlight the value of the assurance service.  
***Insert Table 8 here*** 
Second, we test impacts associated with the non-client market. If sustainability 
restatements increase the legitimacy of the SRA provider’s services, we would expect to see 
an increase in demand for its services from external users. We conduct this analysis at the 
provider level and use our pool of observations over the 2010-2014 period.  We create an 
indicator variable where one designates an increase in a provider’s number of assurance 
clients relative to the prior year. If the number of clients decreases or remains unchanged, we 
code the variable as zero. We regress our client increase variable on the presence of a 
restatement in any report assured by the given assurance provider in the previous period, and 
we test this across all categories of restatement. We also control for assurer type and year 
fixed effects. As indicated in Table 8, Panel B, restatements, overall, are positively and 
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significantly associated with increases in assurance clients in the subsequent period. With 
respect to specific types of restatements, our results indicate that both methodological and 
material restatements are positively and significantly related to increases in clients. In contrast, 
error restatements and non-material restatements, although positively signed, are not 
significant at conventional levels. Overall, our analyses suggest restatements are not leading to 
negative impacts for assurance providers, and may be enhancing legitimacy with respect to 
client retention and growth.   
Impacts on clients  
Finally, if restatements lead to negative effects for client firms, it would again be 
unlikely that the clients would agree to their disclosure. Given that prior research documents 
that investors react negatively to financial restatements, we explore the market reactions to 
sustainability restatements. Relying on Lexis-Nexis and broad internet searches, we are able 
to isolate the report release date for 484 of our sample sustainability reports, 92 of which 
contain a restatement. Following Guidry and Patten (2010), we use a market-adjusted model 
based on an equally weighted index to estimate abnormal returns over a three-day window. 
For each report, we subtract the CRSP market index return from the company’s daily return 
to obtain the market-adjusted abnormal return for the three trading days (-1, 0, +1) 
surrounding the release date. We sum the daily abnormal returns to calculate the cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR) for each release and test for differences across reports with and 
without restatements. Results (un-tabulated) show no significant differences, indicating the 
market does not penalize firms for disclosing sustainability restatements, again lending 
credence to our argument that restatements can be used as a legitimacy-building tool.  
Discussion and conclusion 
As the importance of sustainability information in assessing firm-specific value creation 
and future economic prospects increases (WBCSD, 2016; GRI, 2011; 2013; GSSB, 2015; 
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SASB, 2016; IAASB, 2016; AICPA, 2016), understanding sustainability restatements 
becomes imperative. We rely on the theory of professionalization as a framework to examine 
sustainability restatements. Theory argues that assurance providers attempting to gain market 
share in a new service arena must first create legitimacy for their services, and we posit that 
sustainability restatements serve to enhance both the credibility of report-issuing firms’ 
commitment to sustainability and the legitimacy of SRA services. Based on a large sample of 
standalone sustainability reports issued by U.S. firms from 2010 through 2014, we find that 
the presence of restatements is positively associated with SRA. We document that this 
relation holds more strongly for errors as opposed to methodological updates, and that 
assurance is significantly associated with the presence of quantitatively non-material 
restatements. Our results thus support the argument that, as the SRA profession attempts to 
gain market share in a new space, assurance providers appear to use formal restatements to 
reveal both a problem associated with sustainability reporting (inaccurate data) and a solution 
to that problem (SRA services) represented by restatements, while allowing clients to portray 
to stakeholders an image of transparency, hence co-building legitimacy. We also find that 
legitimizing tactics differ across SRA provider types. Consultants are more likely to disclose 
both methodological updates and non-material restatements, the latter likely indicating the 
restrictions professional accountants face with respect to historical financial statement 
auditing standards. Our evidence supports Malsch’s (2013) claims that firm-specific 
sustainability practices, focused on business risks as a way to gain an economic advantage in 
the market, foster SRA’s development of new services. 
Our findings provide several contributions to the literature. First, we provide an 
empirical illustration of a new form of legitimacy used within the U.S. SRA market, one that 
is used differently by the two main provider types. Additionally, our study contributes to the 
understanding of consultant assurer behavior which has received less attention in prior 
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accounting literature. We also contribute to Moroney and Trotman’s (2016) experimental 
work on the materiality thresholds within the SRA domain. They find that accountant SRA 
providers do not consider audit differences below five percent as material, and our empirical 
results support this finding. However, we add to their findings by providing evidence that 
consultants do provide restatements for non-material amounts (and for updates to 
methodology). We argue that the differences likely represent the use of all forms of 
restatements by consultants, who control the market in the U.S. (contrary to the global 
market), to potentially defend their competitive position and gain additional market share in 
this unique space.  
Our study also enhances the theoretical framework we rely on. The theory of 
professionalization prescribes that the tasks of professions are vulnerable to changes in the 
development of the profession and to changes in society (Abbott, 1988). We find that, not 
only do tasks change as a consequence of a new professional environment, but that 
professional groups appear to have the ability to diametrically alter the meaning of tasks in 
order to create legitimacy for their services within a new professional space. While 
restatements are commonly accepted evidence of audit failure within the auditing 
professional space (consultants have no prior experience with assurance provision), the 
ambiguous guidelines for reporting and assurance provision within the new SRA arena allow 
SRA providers to socially transform restatements into a representative solution to the 
problem associated with the quality of sustainability reporting. As such, they create 
legitimacy and demand for their services. Furthermore, our findings speak to the concept of 
interprofessional competition among different groups vying for a new professional space. To 
the extent that a profession (in our case, professional accountants) specifies the admissible 
type of evidence of solutions (restatements), it risks competition with groups whose overall 
set of standards are less restrictive (consultants) (Abbott 1988). This less restricted group can 
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then more easily assimilate those skills and solve problems to improve their legitimacy within 
the arena as well, increasing competition and claims to the new professional space. Our 
research contributes to the understanding of the assimilation of SRA practices between 
professional groups and the use of differences in professional skill sets to adopt divergent 
strategies involving restatements.  
While we believe SRA providers may be using restatements to their advantage with 
respect to the development of the profession, we also acknowledge that the relative newness 
of the field plays a role in their ability to do so. Immature reporting and assurance standards 
in combination with the transfer of financial auditing practices by professional accountants 
and the development of assurance concepts by sustainability consultants likely result in a 
substantial learning curve (O’Dwyer, 2011). Further, providers may face difficulties in 
discovering errors prior to reporting because of under-developed or non-existent internal 
reporting systems and internal control systems for sustainability within firms, and, at least in 
some cases, the fact that SRA only offers a limited level of assurance. At the same time, 
providers are somewhat insured against reputational harm from the disclosure of restated 
information due to these factors. SRA providers face less public scrutiny of assurance effort 
than financial statement auditors due to the ambiguity in assurance standards across the two 
types of engagements, and sustainability restatements receive less unfavorable attention than 
financial restatements.   
Claims to a new professional space develop over a long period of time (Abbott, 1988).  
As reporting standards become more fine-tuned, reporting systems within organizations 
strengthen, auditing training includes sustainability, and more stringent controls are 
developed to assist with more efficient reporting, SRA providers will face a more pervasive 
reporting process, rendering more consistency in their services, and presumably, less 
opportunity to use restatements as a legitimizing tool. At the same time, this iterative learning 
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process, perhaps partly fueled by the ability to use restated data, may indeed be leading to the 
provision of better, more meaningful information through sustainability reporting. We leave 
investigation of that possibility to future research.   
Our findings suggest other potentially interesting extensions. Future research could focus 
on countries where reporting and SRA have a longer tenure and history and where the 
institutional environment (such as, for example, the level of litigation or the maturity of the 
SRA market) may lead to different insights. Given our findings on the restatement of non-
material information, future research could also explore how differing types and levels of 
restatement influence stakeholders’ assessments and decisions. Similarly, exploring whether 
the practice of restating sustainability information improves management’s accountability to 
stakeholders could provide additional understanding of the impact of SRA on firm behavior.  
As with all studies, ours suffers from certain limitations. First, we cannot identify firms 
that may restate information but do not disclose that they have done so, nor can we assess 
whether assurance impacts such decisions. Second, Ballou, Casey, Grenier, and Heitger 
(2012) report that some firms obtaining assurance do not publicly report this information and 
we cannot assess the degree to which such behavior may alter our results. Third, we focus on 
one country and a limited time-series. We cannot completely disentangle whether 
restatements are a co-produced legitimacy tactic on the part of SRA providers and firms, or 
just a natural consequence of the early stage of SRA in the U.S, or both. We believe our 
analysis is rigorous and points towards restatements used as a legitimacy building tool, based 
on differences across the type and size of restatements when SRA is present. Finally, while 
we employ a variety of sensitivity tests to address potential factors influencing the relations 
we report, we cannot completely rule out that some time-variant unobservable characteristics 
are driving our results.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample selection and characteristics 
2010-2014 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 Observations 
Initial sample of firm-year observations 2,817 
Less:  
Not issuing a stand-alone CSR report 1,106 
Reports not available 299 
Irregular reports 111 
Control variables not available 100 
Total firm year observations available (reports analyzed) 1,200 
Unique firm observations 372 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution over time 
 
Year Freq. Percent Cum. 
2010 231 19.25 19.25 
2011 239 19.92 39.17 
2012 259 21.58 60.75 
2013 225 18.75 79.50 
2014 246 20.50 100.00 
Total 1200 100   
     
41 
 
TABLE 2 
Restatement by year 
 
 
Year Number of Restatements 
Number of Reports with 
Restatements 
% Reports with 
Restatement  
2010 39 24 10.39% 
2011 49 27 11.30% 
2012 61 35 13.52% 
2013 62 39 17.33% 
2014 96 52 21.14% 
Total 307 177  
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TABLE 3 
Instances of restatements 
Panel A: Breakdown of assurance and restatement  
Total observations 1,200 
Reports with assurance 290 
Reports with assurance provided by consulting firms 226 
Reports with assurance provided by accounting firms 64 
Reports with at least one restatement 177 
Reports with at least one error restatement  116 
Reports with at least one methodological update restatement (a) 72 
Reports with at least one material restatement (b) 85 
Reports with at least one non-material restatement (b) 98 
 
Panel B: Comparison of proportion of reports with a restatement across assurance groups 
 Any Restatement Error  
Restatement 
Methodological 
Update Restatement 
Reports including assurance 99/290 (34.1%) 72/290 (24.8%) 36/290 (12.4%) 
Reports without assurance 78/910 (  8.6%) 44/910 (  4.8%) 36/910 (  4.0%) 
Chi-Square 114.32 100.66 27.89 
Significance < .001 < .001 < .001 
    
 Material 
Restatement(b) 
Non-Material 
Restatement(b) 
Reports including assurance 56/276 (20.3%) 58/276 (21.0%) 
Reports without assurance 29/885 (  3.3%) 40/885 (  4.5%) 
Chi-Square 89.75 74.07 
Significance < .001 < .001 
(a) Since each report may include more than one restatement, the sum of error and methodological update 
restatements is greater than 177. 
(b) We classify large restatements as those where the difference in reported data is more than five percent of the 
originally reported value. There are 39 cases in which we cannot assess the size of the, therefore the 
number of observations drops from 1,200 to 1,161. 
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TABLE 4 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variables N Mean Std dev Min Median Max 
Report Size (pages) 1,200 59.273 56.798 2 46 581 
GRI 1,200 0.523 0.500 0 1 1 
Firm Size (log sales) 1,200 9.413 1.168 6.745 9.337 11.969 
Sustainability Performance 1,200 3.093 2.919 0 2 18 
ROA 1,200 0.100 0.066 -0.049 0.092 0.362 
LEV 1,200 0.251 0.150 0.000 0.239 0.786 
ESSI 1,200 0.287 0.452 0 0 1 
 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Restatement 1.000        
2 Assurance 0.310*** 1.000 
      
3 Report Size  0.273*** 0.332*** 1.000 
     4 GRI 0.252*** 0.371*** 0.427*** 1.000 
    5 Firm Size  0.153*** 0.125*** 0.287*** 0.108*** 1.000 
   6 Sustainability 
Performance 0.087** 0.110*** 0.187*** 0.074* 0.486*** 1.000 
  7 ROA 0.050 -0.013 -0.011 0.080** 0.004 -0.027 1.000 
 8 LEV -0.011 0.03 0.097*** 0.077** -0.121*** 0.067* -0.071* 1.000 
9 ESSI 0.085** 0.074* 0.115*** 0.174*** -0.007 0.149*** 0.031 0.140*** 
Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1.  *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively.  
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TABLE 5 
Logistic analysis of the impact of assurance on sustainability restatements 
 
 
Any 
restatement 
Error 
Methodological 
update 
Material 
restatement 
Non-Material 
restatement 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Assurance 1.073*** 1.328*** 0.539* 1.341*** 1.028*** 
 
(4.584) (4.726)  (1.831) (4.581) (3.421) 
Report Size 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005 *** 
 (3.308) (3.276) (3.065) (3.732) (3.901) 
GRI 1.004*** 0.798*** 0.920*** 1.368*** 1.080*** 
 (3.767) (2.665) (2.613) (3.233) (2.661)  
Firm Size 0.162 0.236 0.049 0.162 0.203 
 
(1.592) (1.966)** (0.361) (1.126) (1.530) 
Sustainability Performance 0.045 0.026 0.094 -0.041 0.039 
 
(0.925) (0.492) (1.586) (-0.673) (0.602) 
ROA 2.391 1.468 2.741 2.825 3.074 
 
(1.427) (0.843) (1.070) (1.491) (1.455) 
LEV -1.019 -0.404 -1.876* -0.313 -0.667 
 
(-1.340) (-0.472) (-1.670) (-0.334) (-0.686) 
ESSI 0.247 -0.064 0.392 -0.201 0.307 
 
(1.005) (-0.215) (1.481) (-0.688) (1.036) 
Constant -4.430*** -5.723*** -3.779*** -5.902*** -5.704*** 
 
(-4.401) (-4.699) (-2.599) (-4.279) (-4.112) 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,161 1,161 
Pseudo R-squared 0.174 0.161 0.126 0.200 0.173 
Table 5 presents the result from regressing the likelihood of restatements (column 1), error (column 2), methodological update 
(column 3), material (column 4) and non-material (column 5) restatements on SRA presence. The table reports logistic 
coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust z-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by firm. All other variables definitions 
are reported in Appendix 1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed), respectively.  
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TABLE 6 
Logistic analysis of the impact of assurance by provider type on sustainability 
restatements 
 
 
Any 
restatement 
Error 
Methodological 
update 
Material 
restatement 
Non-Material 
restatement 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Consultant 1.065*** 1.345*** 0.526* 1.353*** 1.091*** 
 (4.186) (4.519) (1.693) (4.342) (3.523) 
Accounting firm 1.099*** 1.269*** 0.589 1.305*** 0.796 
 (3.153) (2.972) (1.269) (3.003) (1.518) 
Report Size 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005 *** 
 (3.313) (3.231) (2.958) (3.714) (3.766) 
GRI 1.002*** 0.802*** 0.918*** 1.370*** 1.092*** 
 (3.761) (2.677) (2.601) (3.230) (2.698) 
Firm Size 0.162 0.237** 0.049 0.162 0.207 
 
(1.594) (1.977) (0.355) (1.132) (1.530) 
Sustainability   Performance 0.045 0.026 0.094 -0.042 0.036 
 
(0.932) (0.480) (1.583) (-0.680) (0.566) 
ROA 2.382 1.493 2.729 2.845 3.162 
 
(1.418) (0.862) (1.062) (1.515) (1.509) 
LEV -1.028 -0.382 -1.895* -0.298 -0.578 
 
(-1.335) (-0.438) (-1.680) (-0.313) (-0.600) 
ESSI 0.251 -0.075 0.399 -0.209 0.271 
 
(0.994) (-0.242) (1.488) (-0.698) (0.894) 
Constant -4.426*** -5.735*** -3.771*** -5.911*** -5.755*** 
 
(-4.414) (-4.731) (-2.577) (-4.318) (-4.096)  
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,161 1,161 
Pseudo R-squared 0.174 0.161 0.126 0.200 0.174 
Table 6 presents the result from regressing the likelihood of restatements (column 1), error (column 2), methodological update 
(column 3), material (column 4) and non-material (column 5) restatements on whether SRA is provided by a consulting or 
accounting firm. The table reports logistic coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust z-statistics. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm. All other variables definitions are reported in Appendix 1. *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 
0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed), respectively.  
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TABLE 7 
Propensity score matching 
Panel A: Mean of covariates in the propensity score matching 
 
 
Assurance 
sample 
Control 
sample t-stat p>t 
GRI 66.704 78.778 -0.90 0.352 
Report Size 0.741 0.704 0.30 0.767 
Firm Size 9.414 9.688 -0.90 0.368 
Sustainability Performance 2.111 1.852 0.47 0.638 
ROA 0.099 0.105 -0.30 0.731 
LEV 0.312 0.295 0.39 0.698 
ESSI 0.333 0.370 -0.20 0.781 
CSR committee 0.815 0.889 -0.70 0.453 
Membership to CSR Index 0.481 0.481 0.00 1.000 
Bid-ask Spread 0.011 0.011 0.04 0.972 
Audit Committee Size 4.407 4.407 0.00 1.000 
Foreign Income 0.556 0.593 -0.20 0.788 
CEO Duality 0.111 0.111 -0.00 1.000 
n. of Board Meetings 8.407 8.630 -0.20 0.792 
Board Size 11.370 11.407 -0.00 0.932 
% Independent Directors 0.880 0.889 -0.60 0.545 
Institutional Ownership 0.889 0.926 -0.40 0.646 
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Panel B: Logistic regression on propensity score matched sample 
 
 
Any 
restatement 
Error 
Methodological 
update 
Material 
restatement 
Non-Material 
restatement 
Assurance 1.228*** 1.515*** 0.617* 1.924*** 1.110*** 
 
(4.241) (4.316) (1.755) (4.184) (3.324) 
Report Size 0.005* 0.005** 0.003 0.005** 0.004** 
 
(1.941) (2.121) (1.314) (2.381) (2.136) 
GRI 0.878** 0.736 0.353 1.997** 0.397 
 
(2.050) (1.499) (0.719) (2.402) (0.736) 
Firm Size 0.312** 0.293 0.177 0.556** 0.309* 
 
(2.011) (1.637) (0.974) (2.344) (1.829) 
Sustainability  -0.030 -0.037 0.060 -0.135 -0.045 
   Performance (-0.446) (-0.459) (0.739) (-1.210) (-0.560) 
ROA 0.606 -0.773 2.044 1.615 2.327 
 
(0.249) (-0.269) (0.582) (0.668) (0.783) 
LEV -1.612 -1.016 -2.467 -1.717 -1.061 
 
(-1.427) (-0.769) (-1.636) (-1.042) (-0.824) 
ESSI 0.307 -0.071 0.465 0.015 0.377 
 
(0.990) (-0.180) (1.215) (0.036) (1.018) 
Constant -5.167*** -5.454*** -5.242*** -10.134*** -5.922*** 
 
(-3.421) (-3.470) (-2.666) (-4.944) (-3.528) 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 372 372 372 352 352 
Pseudo R-squared 0.116 0.121 0.097 0.200 0.091 
Table 7, Panel A provides means of the covariates for the treated (assurance) vs. control group of firms in the PSM sample. 
Panel B reports the logistic regression on the propensity score matched sample. Control variables definitions are reported in 
Appendix 1. The table reports logistic coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust z-statistics. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-tailed), respectively. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
TABLE 8 
Legitimacy of the assurance provider 
 
Panel A. Likelihood to retain assurance provider 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Restatement(t-1) 0.787 
  
 
(1.793)* 
  Error(t-1) 
 
0.565 
 
  
(1.211) 
 Methodological updates(t-1) 
 
0.968 
 
  
(1.142) 
 Material Restatement(t-1) 
  
0.981 
   
(1.461)+ 
Non-material Restatement(t-1) 
  
0.288 
   
(0.560) 
Report Size(t-1) 0.007 0.007 0.006 
 
(1.716)* (1.732)* (1.621) 
Size(t-1) -0.568 -0.546 -0.619 
 
(-2.669)*** (-2.551)** (-2.746)*** 
ROA(t-1) 0.171 0.229 1.078 
 
(0.069) (0.093) (0.445) 
LEV(t-1) 0.452 0.456 0.653 
 
(0.374) (0.377) (0.552) 
ESSI -0.827 -0.806 -0.949 
 
(-1.939)* (-1.914)* (-2.178)** 
Governance Concerns(t-1) -0.428 -0.461 -0.490 
 
(-1.987)** (-2.189)** (-2.217)** 
Governance Strengths(t-1) 0.584 0.573 0.556 
 
(1.787)* (1.770)* (1.628) 
Social and environmental concerns(t-1) 0.308 0.298 0.360 
 
(2.985)*** (2.854)*** (3.325)*** 
Constant 3.986 3.884 4.273 
 
(2.320)** (2.264)** (2.297)** 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 217 217 210 
Pseudo R-squared 0.127 0.125 0.135 
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Panel B. Likelihood to increase number of clients 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Restatement(t-1) 1.116 
  
 
(1.962)** 
  Error(t-1) 
 
0.468  
  
(0.836)  
Methodological updates(t-1) 
 
1.316 
 
  
(2.128)** 
 Material Restatement(t-1) 
  
1.112 
   
(1.749)* 
Non-material Restatement(t-1) 
  
-0.184 
 
  
(-0.275) 
Accounting firm 0.450 0.625 0.515 
 (0.696) (0.963) (0.800) 
Constant -2.357 -2.341 -1.991 
 (-3.190)*** (-3.185)*** (-2.894)*** 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES 
Observations 96 96 95 
R-squared 0.119 0.132 0.112 
Table 8 presents evidence on the legitimacy of the assurance providers. Panel A presents results where we regress the 
likelihood to retain the assurance provider on the presence of at least one restatement (column 1), one error or 
methodological update (column 2), and one material or non-material restatement (column 3). All independent variables are 
lagged at t-1. The table reports logistic coefficient estimates and (in brackets) robust z-statistics. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm. Panel B presents results where we regress the likelihood of increasing the number of clients on the 
presence of at least one restatement (column 1), one error or methodological update (column 2), and one material or non-
material restatement (column 3). The table reports logistic coefficient estimates and (in brackets) z-statistics. Governance 
concerns and strengths are respectively the KLD Corporate Governance Strengths and Concerns Scores, while Social and 
Environmental Concerns are equal to the sum of the KLD Concerns scores in the following areas: Community, Employee 
Relations, Human Rights, Diversity, Product Responsibility, Environment. All other variable definitions are reported in 
Appendix 1.  
+ represent significance level of 0.10 (one-tailed), *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 (two-
tailed), respectively.  
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Appendix 1 
Variable definitions 
Restatement variables 
Restatement dummy equal to 1 if the firm discloses any restatement; 0 otherwise; 
Error dummy equal to 1 if the firm discloses at least one restatement due to 
error; 0 otherwise; 
Methodological update dummy equal to 1 if the firm discloses at least one restatement due to a 
methodological update; 0 otherwise; 
Material restatement dummy equal to 1 if the firm discloses at least one restatement due to 
error of magnitude greater or equal to a 5% change in the data; 0 
otherwise; 
Non-material restatement dummy equal to 1 if the firm discloses at least one restatement due to 
error of magnitude less than a 5% change in the data; 0 otherwise; 
Assurance variables 
Assurance dummy equal to 1 if the firm purchases external assurance for the entire 
sustainability report or for specific items; 0 otherwise; 
Accounting firm dummy equal to 1 if the firm purchases external assurance from an 
accounting firm; 0 otherwise; 
Consultant dummy equal to 1 if the firm purchases external assurance from a 
consulting firm; 0 otherwise; 
Control variables 
Report Size length of report, measured by pages;  
GRI dummy equal to 1 if the firm indicates their adherence to the Global 
Reporting Initiatives guidelines, 0 otherwise; 
Firm Size natural log of total sales; 
Sustainability Performance KLD total concerns score (governance, community, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, human rights, and product); 
ROA return on assets measured as the ratio of income before extraordinary 
items to total assets at the beginning of each year; 
LEV ratio of total debt to total assets; 
ESSI dummy equal to 1 if firm is in environmental or social sensitive industry, 
0 otherwise; 
Additional variables in PSM 
CSR committee dummy equal to 1 if there is a CSR committee; 0 otherwise; 
Membership to CSR Index dummy equal to 1 if the company is listed in a CSR index; 0 otherwise; 
Bid-ask Spread average of daily effective bid-ask spreads during quarter t, where the 
effective bid-ask spread is measured as two times the absolute value of 
the difference between the daily ending trading price and the average of 
the ask and bid, scaled by the average of ask and bid; 
Audit Committee Size total number of members on the audit committee; 
Foreign Income dummy equal to 1 if a firm has income from foreign operations in a 
given year, 0 otherwise; 
CEO Duality dummy equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board; 0 
otherwise; 
n. of Board Meetings total number of board meetings in each year; 
Board Size total number of board members; 
% Independent Directors proportion of independent directors to total directors; 
Institutional Ownership % of shares held by institutional investors. 
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1. Reconciliation of KPMG 2013 sample to our 2013 sample 
 
 Observations 
Initial sample of firm-year observations KPMG 99 
Less:  
KPMG sample firm not included in our sample due to attrition 
described in Table 1 
31 
KPMG sample not issuing a stand-alone CSR report 14 
KPMG reports no restatement, we agree 40 
KPMG reports no restatement, we find a restatement 5 
KPMG reports restatement due to factor other than error, we 
find the restatement is an error 
6 
KPMG reports restatement due to factor other than error, we 
agree 
3 
Firms remaining in KPMG U.S. sample 0 
 
We obtained private information from KPMG regarding the data for the firms responding to 
their 2013 questionnaire and were able to isolate the U.S. results from the global results. There are 
differences between our sample and KPMG’s, attributable mainly to scope and methodological 
differences, as well as the fact that KPMG provides restatement results on a global basis for only the 
largest 100 firms in each country and we focus on U.S. S&P 500 firms. Within KPMG’s (2013) 
survey, there is one question pertaining to restatements, asking whether the firm’s report discusses 
changes in previous years’ data and provides the following as possible reasons for that change: A. 
Restatements due to error or omission, B. Restatements due to updated (improved) 
estimation/calculation methodology, C. Update of definitions applied, D. Update of scope (not 
relating to change in acquisition/divestments), and/or E. Other (please specify).  
One difference between our methodology and that of KPMG is that we actually analyze each 
firm’s sustainability report for discussions of changes in the previous years’ data instead of relying on 
management’s own admission about whether they have a restatement (i.e. questionnaire response). 
Additionally, KPMG states they rely on “Reports published between mid-2012 and mid-2013… If a 
company did not report during this period, information from 2011 was used” (KPMG 2013, 6). 
Therefore, KPMG’s report may include information for 2011, 2012, or 2013 depending on the timing 
of the questionnaire and the firm’s specific reporting year (companies have scheduled sustainability 
reporting years similar to fiscal years for financial reporting and these vary). Given the differences in 
scope and methodology, we reconcile our 2013 restatement sample with KPMG.  
KPMG’s sample includes 99 U.S. firms, 14 of which do not provide a sustainability report 
and 31 of which were not included in our sample for that particular year (of these KPMG reported 3 
restatements due to methodological updates). Additionally, 40 of these reports had no restatements, to 
which we agreed. Of the remaining 14 firms, KPMG reported 5 firms who responded to the 
questionnaire that they did not have a restatement, but we found restatements of errors within their 
reports. An example is one firm with three separate restatements utilizing the same description, “Data 
for previous years has been revised since the 2011 Corporate Citizenship Interim Report, to reflect 
corrections made as a result of internal reviews.” KPMG also provided 6 firms who answered yes to 
the restatement question and offered reasons other than errors for the restatement and we found that 
those restatements were actually due to errors. An example of this is one firm with the following 
language associated with their restatement in their sustainability report, “In 2013, we identified a 
significant error in our waste and recycling reporting, which resulted in a major restatement of our 
waste diversion rate for 2011 and 2012.” Finally, there were 3 firms KPMG listed as having a 
restatement due to a methodological update with which we agreed. The reconciliation of these 
differences between our samples alters KPMG’s reported restatement rates of 14 percent (12 
methodological updates) to a restatement rate of 26 percent (11 errors, 3 methodological updates), 
which is more closely aligned with our larger sample reporting a restatement of 17 percent (24 errors, 
16 methodological updates).  
53 
 
2. Sustainability Restatement Examples 
 
Restatement due to error: Baxter (2011, p. 94) 
 
“Subsequent to publishing the 2009 Sustainability Report, the company received information 
from facilities to permit exceedances that warrant correction for 2006-2009. Instead of a 29% 
reduction on environmental incidents from 2005 to 2009, the corrected data shows a 7% 
increase during the period”.  
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Restatement due to methodological update:  General Mills (2014, p. 102) 
“*** Some data are restated compared to reporting in prior years to reflect improvements in data gathering and tracking methodology” (restated data is 
reflected in table with ***). 
 
 
 
